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Fishers with individual catch quota, but limited control over the mix
of species caught, depend on trade and catch–quota balancing al-
lowances to fully utilize their quota without discarding. However,
these allowances can theoretically lead to overfishing if total allow-
able catches (TACs) are consistently exceeded. This study investi-
gates usage of balancing allowances by the Icelandic demersal
fleet over 2001–2017, for over 1,900 vessels. When a vessel’s demer-
sal catch exceeds owned and leased quota for a given species, the gap
can be bridged by borrowing quota from the subsequent fishing pe-
riod or transforming unutilized quota in other species, restricted by
limits. Conversely, excess quota can be saved or transformed into
quota for species where there is a shortfall. We found evidence that
balancing behavior is frequently similar across the fleet. Transforma-
tions are consistent with indicators of a general quota shortage and
potential for arbitrage caused by differences in conversion ratios used
for transformation and lease prices. Larger companies contribute
more to these patterns. Nevertheless, TAC overages are generally
modest especially in recent years—key reasons appear to be the tight-
ening of vessel transformation limits and the central role of Atlantic
cod, which is the main target species but cannot be persistently overf-
ished due to a specific prohibition on positive transformations into
the species. These results show how the tailored design of the Icelan-
dic catch–quota balancing system has helped in balancing economic
and ecological goals of management. We suggest policy changes that
could further reduce ecological risks, e.g., prioritizing between-year
transfers over transformations.
catch–quota balancing | fisheries management | incentives
Harvesters in mixed-species individual quota fisheries (IQs or,if transferable, ITQs) potentially face a dilemma; what to do
if they run out of quota in one species before they have used up
remaining quota in other species (1, 2). One possible response,
continuing to fish but discarding excess catch, has negative conse-
quences and is now prohibited in many fisheries (3, 4). Purchasing
additional quota can help but is sometimes not possible: If trade is
prohibited for broader reasons (5), a particular quota is scarce due
to a systemwide imbalance (6, 7), or frictional trading costs are high.
Then harvesters may have to choose between illegal discarding and
forfeiting unused quota. For these reasons, catch–quota balancing
mechanisms have been introduced in a number of fisheries (8).
Despite their limited track record, balancing mechanisms are likely
to play an increasingly important role in fisheries management due
to proliferation of ITQ systems (9) and discard bans (4), climate
change-driven perturbation of marine ecosystems (10, 11), as well as
the low amount of catch compared to quota in several mixed ITQ
systems and the resulting loss of potential catch value (12, 13).
Catch–quota balancing mechanisms include banking (i.e., trans-
fer of quota between periods; Fig. 1), transformation (i.e., exchange
of quota in one species for quota in another species), and surrender
(2, 8) (i.e., catch in excess of quota is “sold” at a prescribed price to
the fishery manager). These mechanisms give harvesters limited
flexibility to balance quota to catch after fishing. Experience of
catch–quota balancing mechanisms has been mixed; while banking
is common and has been positively associated with stock status
across fisheries (5), transformation has been introduced and later
abandoned in Canada and New Zealand due to concerns about
overfishing (8) but survived, with modifications, in Iceland (14). A
chief concern regarding these mechanisms is that they allow for
implicit quota exchange rates (between quota in different periods
or species), which may not be aligned with the equivalent ex-
change rates in quota markets. Where the quota exchange rates
implied by balancing mechanisms differ from market exchange
rates, harvesters will have an incentive to use balancing (15) to
exploit the differences, effectively engaging in arbitrage (16). Such
incentives are of concern to fishery managers because they are
systematic, potentially causing larger gaps between harvest and
total allowable catch (TAC). This does not necessarily mean that
all instances of systematic behavior must be due to arbitrage; they
may also be due to species for which there is a general quota
shortage, for instance when, for rebuilding purposes, quota are set
at low levels compared to actual biomass (if such species are
caught together with target species, they can constrain the amount
of catch of target species and function as so-called “choke”
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species). The distinction between drivers, a general quota shortage
as opposed to arbitrage, is important because the latter can be
sufficient to be the cause of persistent overfishing while the same
is not true for the former.
The Icelandic ITQ-managed mixed demersal fishery is a suitable
system for investigating catch–quota balancing behavior due to its
use of all of the above-mentioned mechanisms (Fig. 1) as well as
quota trade over an extended period, and the availability of detailed
vessel- and company-level data. Previous analysis of aggregate bal-
ancing outcomes found that TAC overages were modest and did
not occur consistently in any species from 2001 to 2013 (14). The
current study extends this research, using a complete dataset of
individual catch–quota balancing of over 1,900 vessels between 2001
and 2017, to explore the extent to which balancing behavior cancels
out at the fleet level and if the pattern of behavior is consistent with
hypothesized incentives and constraints. We would expect unpre-
dictable local variation in catch to lead to balancing behavior that
cancels out substantially at the fleet level, whereas systemwide
constraints or incentives would be more likely to result in similar,
seemingly systematic, behavior across vessels. We investigate both
banking and transformation behavior, although we place greater
emphasis on the latter mechanism since it can theoretically lead to
persistent and significant overfishing of particular species. In con-
trast, the long-term risk from bringing quota forward is relatively
low since the maximum amount is limited relative to annual quota
and the impact is therefore diluted over longer time periods. The
Icelandic ITQ system also allows for surrender of catch, but the
associated volumes for demersal species are low, equating to 0.5%
of total demersal quota between 2002 and 2017 (SI Appendix, Table
S3), and have therefore been excluded from the analysis.
We began by investigating the extent to which balancing be-
havior (i.e., positive and negative flows) was similar across ves-
sels for each species–year combination. In order to quantify
behavioral similarity in balancing, we created a standardized
index of the overall directionality of balancing adjustments, de-









where Ps is the positive quota adjustment for vessel i (0 when
negative), and Ns is the negative quota adjustment for vessel i (0
when positive). This index takes values between −1 and +1; the
former implies that transformation or banking are purely nega-
tive, the latter that transformation or banking are purely positive,
while 0 indicates equal volumes of positive and negative flows.
The directionality index was calculated separately for quota
transformed and quota banked at the end of each year.
We then used a regression model to examine the drivers of the
directionality of transformations (we refer to this model as the
“transformation directionality model”). We developed quantita-
tive proxy measures of proposed behavioral drivers, namely, the
following: potential for arbitrage (arbitrage potential), the ability to
target species (targeting indicator), as well as a systemwide quota
shortage (choke indicator). The potential for arbitrage arises when
the quota conversion rate set by the fishery manager differs from
the conversion rate that can be achieved in the quota market,
Fig. 1. Transformation and banking limits in the Iceland ITQ system. Positive (light green)/negative (red) limits restrict increases (decreases) in the permitted
catch of the relevant species in the current period. Total cod equivalents (CEs) (units converting species quota to the same unit based on last year’s price
relative to cod) are summed across species before applying the 1.5% positive transformation and 5% total transformation limits; all others are applied as
percentages of the originating species quota. The arrows are scaled relative to the total percentage of CE of the relevant species. The left-hand side of the
figure shows how transformation limits are designed asymmetrically; the positive limits are based on a vessel’s total CE quota, aggregated across species,
which is the same for all species, while the negative limits are based on quota in the relevant species. This means that the overall fleetwide limit on positive
transformations can potentially be several times TAC for low biomass species (it is 75 times TAC for common dab) but will be small relative to TAC for high
biomass species and may be further constrained by the limited “supply” of negative transformations from low biomass species.


































i.e., by simultaneously selling quota in one species and purchasing
quota in other species (17). We defined a proxy for each species’
arbitrage potential in a given fishing year based on the ratio be-
tween the average lease cost of quota and transformation cost
(fixed by the fishery manager as the cod equivalent [CE] value
from the previous fishing year). The ratio is then normalized, di-
viding it by the weighted average ratio across all species (excluding
Atlantic cod) to yield the proxy. An arbitrage potential value of 1
corresponds to parity with a notional basket of the remaining
species, while a value >1 implies that it would be cheaper to obtain
the relevant species quota indirectly by leasing and then trans-
forming quota in other species rather than leasing the desired
species quota directly; a value <1 implies the converse. This proxy
is only a rough indicator of arbitrage potential over the fishing year
as it is based on comparing average lease prices across species,
whereas arbitrage involves risk-free exploitation of contempora-
neous price disparities (16). Harvesters’ ability to exploit arbitrage
potential opportunities is increased when they can proactively target
species, which can be transformed into cheaply (or avoid species
with a high transformation value), potentially exacerbating the risk
of overfishing, i.e., we would expect an interaction effect between
the ability to target species and their arbitrage potential. To assess
this possible behavior, we created an indicator of species targeting,
defined as the percentage of each species total annual catch oc-
curring on trips where the species contributed at least two-thirds of
trip catch (SI Appendix, Supplementary Methods) and interact this
variable with arbitrage potential.
Similar behavior across vessels and a high arbitrage potential
could be caused by a general shortage of quota in the relevant
species (“choke” species) or by arbitrage potential. In order to
distinguish the two phenomena, we included a species choke in-
dicator, calculated as a binary presence/absence variable where a
choke effect was considered present whenever the average lease
price exceeded the average marginal catch value (defined as ex
vessel price less estimated crew share, quota fee, and fuel cost) (1).
We also included TAC in the transformation directionality model
as larger TAC species are more likely to be targeted due to
economies of scale (18) and therefore more likely to be species for
larger positive transformation flows (“sink” species).
We also developed a set of multispecies and single-species re-
gression models to investigate balancing behavior (banking and
transformation) at the individual vessel level and the influence of
different resource user characteristics, including company and
vessel size, and permit type. We refer to these models as the
“vessel-level” models (i.e., single-species and multispecies vessel-
level models). We expected larger companies to more fully utilize
the balancing mechanisms for arbitrage since they would have
more management resources and potentially have more scope to
alter the species mix, especially if they have multiple vessels. This
study examines catch–quota balancing behavior at the vessel and
company level.
The Icelandic system has been adjusted over time, particularly
the limits for transformation and banking, most notably in 2011/
2012 (more detail in SI Appendix). The main rule change re-
duced the limit on negative transformations from 100% of spe-
cies quota held by each vessel to only 30%, and we included this
change as a dummy variable in the vessel-level models to in-
vestigate whether this change was effective. We use the vessel-
level models rather than the transformation directionality model
as only a change in underlying transformation volume would be
expected, which is not captured by the directionality index.
Results and Discussion
There is behavioral similarity in both transformation and banking as
the directionality indices deviate strongly from zero (Fig. 2 B and C).
A small set of species have predominantly negative transformations
effectively acting as “source” of additional quota for other species.
For example, transformations for both dab species were consistently
below −0.5. Similarly, there are “sink” species for which the direction
of transformation appears to be mostly positive (e.g., haddock being
above 0.5 for all years after the rule change). For the majority of
species, the transformation directionality varies from year to year.
Directionality of banking was predominantly negative (i.e., saving
quota to the next year, Fig. 2C), meaning that harvesters prefer to
save quota rather than borrow it, which is a pattern also observed in
other fisheries (8). This result suggests risk aversion on the part of
harvesters in the face of uncertainty regarding future TAC levels and
the potential for choke effects. Overall, catches in the Icelandic
system have been relatively well-aligned with the TAC, and in 2017
on average 88% (82% when excluding all TAC overages) of TAC
was caught in Iceland’s mixed fisheries (Fig. 2A). This is high com-
pared to the 30 to 60% of TAC caught in mixed fisheries that
same year in the United States (13).
We found large variation in arbitrage potential and a clear
difference between species (Fig. 2D), suggesting that it may often
be more profitable for companies to use species transformations
rather than using the lease market. A few species have consis-
tently low arbitrage potential values (e.g., both dab species and
Greenland halibut), implying that harvesters with surplus quota
in these species would have an incentive to transform out of the
quota rather than lease it out. In contrast, other species exhibit
high arbitrage potential, albeit not for every year, indicating that
transformation into these species may be more profitable than
leasing them in. There were few choke observations in the Ice-
landic system: Atlantic cod was indicated as a choke species in all
years and haddock and redfish in several years (Fig. 2E). The
targeting indicator also displays large variability, both between
species and years (Fig. 2G). It is important to notice that some
species, for example monkfish, could be vulnerable species for
the transformation system, as they show both relatively high
values for arbitrage potential and the targeting indicator and a low
TAC; TAC overages for monkfish are, however, modest
(Fig. 2A).
Arbitrage potential was the strongest statistically significant
predictor of directionality of transformations (Table 1), consis-
tent with the hypothesis that harvesters respond to the incentives
arising from misaligned transformation costs and lease prices.
The arbitrage potential predictor was also positively associated
with the catch: quota ratio in the multispecies vessel-level model
as well as 8 out of 14 individual-species vessel-level models
(Fig. 3). Contextual evidence exists to support these findings. For
example, several source species have material amounts of unused
quota that are effectively forfeited (SI Appendix, Fig. S3), and it
is logical to expect the owners of this quota to have fully utilized
opportunities to transform quota of these species into more
valuable species, as predicted by theory (19, 20). We find cir-
cumstantial evidence that transformations may sometimes be
driving quota trade, with an average of 54% of negative trans-
formation volume occurring when the quota was first leased in
and then transformed (SI Appendix, Table S5)—with this ratio
reaching 70% for some species.
On the other hand, we found that the choke indicator does not
significantly predict directionality of transformations, which sug-
gests that the alternative explanation that general quota shortages
would drive up both transformation and relative lease prices is less
supported, strengthening the case for arbitrage-driven behavior. In
the vessel-level models, we found that the choke indicator also
showed no significant effect in the multispecies model as well as
most of the individual-species models, with the exception of a
higher catch-to-quota ratio for redfish and common dab in choke
years and a negative effect on the catch-to-quota ratio for ling
(Fig. 3). The effects for the choke indicator should be read with
caution, however; it could be that the presence/absence indicator
is too coarse to capture a gradual shift in case a species turns out
to be a choke during the fishing year (as lease prices may rise
throughout the year). For redfish, it seems that arbitrage potential



































































and choke indicator act together, with different fishers possibly
responding differently to ecological and economic signals. The way
this could be explained is that, for example, a fishing company may
run out of redfish quota and is forced to pay a high price, while
another fishing company may be using species transformations to
cover their redfish catch while simultaneously leasing out redfish
quota. Moreover, including the cost of fuel is an important as-
sumption when calculating the choke indicator as we assume that
fuel is expended on the species mix and not for target species only;
our results, however, are largely robust to this assumption as shown
in a sensitivity analysis (SI Appendix). It could be that the low
number of choke observations for small biomass species in Iceland
are related to the asymmetry of the transformation limits (Fig. 1);
these limits are hardly ever met by individual vessels for small
biomass species but more frequently so for haddock and redfish
especially after the management changes in 2011/2012 (SI Appendix,
Table S8).
Atlantic cod may be the ultimate choke species in the Ice-
landic demersal quota system as we found that the average cod
quota lease price exceeded estimated marginal value (average
ex-vessel price adjusted for crew share, quota fee, and fuel cost)
in all years. Moreover, the catch–quota balance for cod is nearly
perfectly aligned for the majority of vessels (SI Appendix, Fig.
S2). Atlantic cod is by far the most abundant demersal species
and contributes the majority of the catch value of the Icelandic
demersal fleet, so that each company would need to own some
cod quota to run a demersal fishing operation, but it is the only
species for which quota cannot be increased via transformation.
We found that the vast majority of demersal trips and catch
contain Atlantic cod (SI Appendix, Fig. S4) and Atlantic cod is at
times actively avoided by vessels in the Icelandic fleet (21). Posi-
tive species transformations for many species will thus be limited
due to the choke effect of cod, and the choke effect of cod may
explain the high level of quota saving observed for many species,
while borrowing is observed for cod (Fig. 2C). Ultimately, if cod
quota is exhausted, then there is no incentive to transform into
species for which the amount of cod is the limiting factor. This is
an observation that needs to be considered if fisheries managers
consider translating mechanisms from the Icelandic context to
other fisheries (4), especially in an ecosystem where such a large
economically important species is absent.
The results also show that directionality of transformations is
predictable from TAC, which could be because larger quantities of
fish may be cheaper to process and distribute (Table 1). We find
that transformations tend to reduce catch of low TAC species and
increase catch of high TAC species, for example redfish and
haddock (SI Appendix, Fig. S3). Since the legal limits are more
constraining for transformations into high TAC species (Fig. 1),
the tendency to transform into high TAC species reduces the
ecological risks associated with species transformation. However,
a small negative effect for TAC is shown for six of the single
species models, which may indicate companies needed to rely less
Fig. 2. Variables and indicators for the Icelandic catch–quota balancing system. (A) %TAC caught; (B) directionality of transformations: positive values in-
dicate transformations into the species and negative values indicate transformations out of the species; (C) directionality of banking: positive values indicate
borrowing from next year and negative values indicate saving to next year; (D) arbitrage potential: a value <1 means that it would be cheaper to lease quota
in the corresponding species and then transform into a basket of the other species rather than lease quota for the basket directly; a value >1 implies the
inverse; (E) choke indicator: >1 indicates that the cost of leasing quota exceeds landed value, net of fishermen’s catch share; (F) TAC in kilos of gutted fish; (G)
targeting indicator; (H) directionality of transformations as a function of arbitrage potential (excluding Atlantic cod); and (I) directionality of transformations
as a function of choke indicator (excluding Atlantic cod). The blue triangles indicate observations before the rule change in 2011/2012, which limited flexibility
in transformation usage, while the yellow points indicate observations after the rule change. Species are organized from lowest to highest mean values for
arbitrage potential. Note that a few species have fewer observations as they were added later to the species transformation system (blue ling, greater ar-
gentine, and deep-sea redfish). For each species in A–G, the violin plot indicating the data frequency of distribution is also plotted.


































on balancing mechanisms in high TAC years for those particular
species, possibly indicating a general quota shortage in lower
TAC years.
Contrary to our expectations, the interaction between the
targeting indicator and arbitrage potential had no effect in pre-
dicting directionality of transformations (Table 1), but it did
show a small positive effect in the multispecies vessel-level model
and in five of the species’ vessel-level models (Fig. 3). Some
species (e.g., European plaice, redfish, and lemon sole) are thus
predicted to have increased catches when both the targeting in-
dicator and arbitrage potential have high values, indicating that for
those species arbitrage opportunities increase when the species is
more targetable. However, we also found a negative interaction
effect in five of the single-species vessel-level models, which may
be caused by increased lease prices due to choke effects rather
than arbitrage potential. If species are highly targetable, they may
also be easier to avoid. In a scenario where lease prices rise due
to choking effects, the ability to avoid such species can result in
lower catches.
Larger companies rely more on the transformation system and
possibly make more use of the potential for arbitrage as there
was a small positive effect of total demersal quota holdings in the
multispecies vessel-level model and in 6 out of 14 single-species
vessel-level models (Fig. 3). Moreover, boats with a small boat
permit type (using either only hook and line gear or smaller than
10 gross tonnage) had less catch per quota than larger boats for
most species, indicating more missed fishing opportunities, which
is also demonstrated by larger amounts of unused quota for this
fleet segment (SI Appendix, Fig. S5), as well as less transforma-
tion and banking activity in several species (SI Appendix, Fig. S6).
Only for Greenland halibut is the small boat permit predicted to
have more catch per quota on average, this is because Greenland
halibut is a major source species for the larger boat permit (SI
Appendix, Fig. S6).
The management action in 2011/2012 resulted in negative
changes in catch–quota balance for the sink species Atlantic wolfish,
ling, and monkfish (Fig. 3), as well as a large positive change for
Greenland halibut, which acted as a main source species. Therefore,
the management action appears to have been effective across a
variety of species. This is also reflected in the fact that large TAC
overages became less common after the management action, with
the only overages above 10% of TAC occurring for lemon sole
(Fig. 2A).
Several of our results have important policy implications. First,
the arbitrage incentive that arises from species quota transfor-
mation ratios that are not aligned with quota markets should be
considered when fisheries managers consider the implementa-
tion of such mechanisms e.g., in the context of the common
fisheries policy in the European Union (4). Such incentives could
result in systematic overfishing especially in cases where a highly
constraining factor/species such as the Atlantic cod in the Ice-
landic case is absent. Second, we showed that fishers tend to save
quota rather than borrow from the next year, but that companies
at the same time use species transformations to cover catch in
the same species as is saved. This is possible because balancing is
done at the vessel and not at the company level. Simple policy
changes could be 1) to allow companies to use species trans-
formations to cover catches only if they have already borrowed
the maximum amount from the next year, and 2) to balance catch
to quota at the company level rather than the vessel level. In this
way, a large amount of species transformations could have been
avoided. For instance, 53.3% of positive haddock transforma-
tions could have been avoided if balancing was done at the
company level or if banking was prioritized over transformations
(SI Appendix, Table S6). In addition, the limit for transformation
into each species is based on total vessel quota across species
(Fig. 1). This design feature is particularly risky for profitable
small biomass species as total CE holdings can be several times
their TAC; it would thus be prudent to add a species-specific
limit for positive transformations, as is already the case in Ice-
land for negative transformations.
Beyond fisheries, ITQ balancing mechanisms such as those
studied here could be a template for new approaches to sustainable
governance that respect multiple interconnected planetary bound-
aries to resource utilization and pollution, while recognizing the
potential for marginal trade-offs to improve cost effectiveness (22).
This approach, which may be described as “flexibility within limits,”
allows for partial substitutability between different forms of natural
capital and can therefore be viewed as a compromise between
strong and weak forms of sustainability (23, 24).
In conclusion, with the recent modifications to the catch–quota
balancing system in 2011/2012 and additional slight adjustments,
catch–quota balancing mechanisms could balance socioeconomic
benefits for fishers harvesting uncertain and interconnected nat-
ural resources with ecological risks of overexploitation. Our con-
clusions, however, are very much bound to the Icelandic context
where one highly abundant and strictly managed stock, Atlantic
cod, may drive much of the observed behavior. We advise man-
agers to consider this important role of cod when considering
application of the Icelandic catch–quota balancing system to other
ecosystems. Other mixed-fisheries ITQ systems may have a similar
ubiquitous and economically important species (12, 25) and could
benefit from Iceland’s experiences with the balancing system.
Arbitrage opportunities were nonetheless observed, which in the
absence of restraining factors could result in ecological risks, es-
pecially for valuable low biomass species.
Materials and Methods
We obtained data on catches, quota, and lease values and company char-
acteristics from the Fishery Directorate (www.fiskistofa.is/) (26) and ex-vessel
prices from Statistics Iceland (https://hagstofa.is/) (27).
The targeting indicator was calculated by computing the fraction of catch
for each species where the species was at least two-thirds of the catch. As an
indication of company size, we summarized the companies’ holdings in all
demersal species multiplied by the respective species’ CE value.
The directionality index was predicted using a fractional logit model (28)
and species-level predictors using the following equation:
Ds,t   =   2 * Es,t +   Ps,t   +  Mt + Ft   + «t( ) − 0.5 [2]
where Ds,t is the mean predicted directionality at time t for species s, Es,t is a
matrix of ecological fixed effects (targeting indicator and TAC), Ps,t is a
Table 1. Directionality of transformations model with fractional
logit estimates of the contribution of each of the predictor
variables, SEs, z values, and probabilities
Predictor Estimate SE z value Pr(>jzj)
Arbitrage potential 1.47 0.21 7.14 <0.001
Choke indicator (dummy variable) −0.17 0.44 0.38 0.70
TAC 0.99 0.29 3.41 <0.001
Targeting indicator −0.09 0.14 −0.63 0.53
Targeting indicator * arbitrage potential −0.21 0.15 −1.35 0.18
Cox and Snell’s R2 = 0.27
Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.58
It can be observed that arbitrage potential and total allowable catch
(TAC) are the most important predictors of transformation directionality
with a positive effect. P-values significant at the < 0.05 level are printed in
bold. Predictor variables that were included are as follows (continuous var-
iables are indicated as c; dummy variables as d; ranges are specified): 1)
arbitrage potential (lease price over CE conversion ratio, normalized; c
{95.7; 176.8}); 2) choke indicator (lease price rises above ex-vessel price plus
marginal costs; d {choke observation, no choke observation}); 3) TAC (c {176;
86980}); 4) targeting indicator, percent catch of a species for which a species
is two-thirds of the catch (c {0;1}).



































































matrix of economic time- and species-specific fixed effects (choke indicator
and arbitrage potential), and Ft is a dummy variable for the fishing year. We
used the Newey–West estimator to calculate SEs, which is robust in the
presence of autocorrelation. We chose to use a fractional logit as the di-
rectionality values are bounded between −1 and 1; to meet the require-
ments for the fractional logit model, we divided directionality values by 2
and added 0.5 so that values occur on a continuous interval of 0 to 1.
The individual level models were set up using the following equation
assuming a gamma distribution and using a log link:
μi,s,t =  Q*   E
Es,t  +  Ps,t+Si,t+Ri  +Rs  +  «i,s,t [3]
where μi,s,t is the predicted mean catch of vessel i at time t in species s, Qi,s,t is
quota of vessel i at time t in species s, Si,t is a matrix of vessel and time-fixed
effects, Ri are the vessel random effects, and Rs are the species random ef-
fects. The model is offset by the amount of quota, and therefore predicts the
ratio between mean predicted catch and quota (μ=Q). Autocorrelation in the
time-series was controlled for using a first-order autoregressive model. In all
models, we standardized predictor variables to have a mean of 0 and a SD
of 1.
Data Availability. Anonymized data have been deposited in GitHub, https://
github.com/maartje-oostdijk/quota-balancing.
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